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On 25 February 2002, Rafael Perez, a former oicer 
of the LAPD’s Community Resources Against Street 
Hoodlums unit (CRASH), appeared in court accused 
of various crimes: covering up a bank robbery, 
shooting and framing an innocent citizen, stealing 
and selling cocaine from evidence lockers, being a 
member of the Los Angeles gang called the Bloods, 
and murdering the rapper The Notorious B.I.G. In 
his statement to the court he pointed out that above 
the threshold of doors that lead to CRASH oices 
there are philosophical mottos such as ‘Some rise 
by sin and some by virtue fall’ and ‘We intimidate 
those who intimidate others’. Perez commented: ‘To 
those mottos, I ofer this: “Whoever chases monsters 
should see to it that in the process he does not 
become a monster himself.”’ The quotation from 
Nietzsche might appear unusual coming from the 
mouth of a former police oicer, but it is far from 
uncommon: Whoever Fights Monsters is the title of 
one police memoir, in which Nietzsche’s aphorism 
also appears as an epigraph. The appearance of the 
aphorism is a relection of the extent to which police 
discourse is saturated with the idea of the monstrous: 
‘Catching Monsters’, ‘Fighting Monsters’, mediating 
between ‘monsters and men’.1 What I want to suggest 
here is that we might want to consider the relation-
ship between the monster and the police.*
Take as a starting point the ictional monster 
that appears in the television series Dexter. The 
series is essentially about what might be called an 
ethical serial killer: a killer who kills people who 
deserve to be killed. The main character, Dexter, 
had a traumatic moment at an early age when he 
saw his mother brutally killed with a chainsaw by 
drug dealers. This bloody murder haunts him to the 
point where he is obsessed with blood, which gets 
turned into a ‘positive’, so to speak, by focusing his 
anger on people who deserve to die: essentially, those 
murderers or rapists who have somehow escaped 
the criminal law, often on a minor legal technical-
ity, and who are thus walking free. Not only does 
Dexter kill these people, but he does so in a brutal 
and bloody way, chopping them up and disposing 
of their bodies, and in the process sating his own 
need for blood. The irst thing to note about this is 
that Dexter is framed by the series as some kind of 
monster. ‘I know I’m a monster’, he says when about 
to kill the character Prado (in Season 3). The trope 
of monstrosity appears in various forms: comments 
by other characters on the various monsters which 
murder and rape and destroy lives, such as in Season 
2 when Dexter’s partner Rita comments on a serial 
killer (known as the Bay Harbor Butcher, who is in 
fact Dexter), and says that it makes her angry ‘that 
there’s a monster out there’, or in Series 4 when a 
police forensics expert comments on a woman who 
got away with murdering her husband that ‘if she 
did it, there’s a monster walking free’. But it is in 
Dexter’s voice-over narrative in which his own mon-
strosity is clariied. He reminds us that ‘monsters 
come in all shapes and sizes’ (Season 4, Episode 4) 
and will often add some inesse to the observations 
made by others: ‘I’m not the monster he wants me 
to be’ (Season 1, Episode 4). The point comes up 
time and again: when Brother Sam comments that 
‘men can change’, Dexter comments in voice-over: 
‘Men, maybe, but what about a monster?’ (Season 6, 
Episode 2).
Dexter’s monstrosity is also articulated through 
the primal moment of his (second) birth in the 
shipping container, where he witnessed the bloody 
murder of his mother. In Season 1 (Episode 7), when 
he revisits the shipyard container he comments that 
‘something nameless was born here’. The allusion is 
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9to Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, in which the monster 
has no name, and this ‘Frankenstein theme’ contin-
ues throughout. His adoptive father, who rescued 
Dexter from the scene of his mother’s murder and 
who understands Dexter’s need for blood and helps 
him channel it, says that the doctors who treated 
Dexter ‘didn’t even see the monster inside’ (Season 
2, Episode 4), and when the father enters into one of 
Dexter’s killing scenes he recognizes that he has lost 
the ability to control the monster he helped create 
and so commits suicide. The same theme emerges 
in the inal series when the psychoanalyst who irst 
treated Dexter makes the same point: ‘I helped create 
you’. Other characters who know Dexter make a 
similar point. Lila, his lover in one of the series, says 
to him that ‘you make yourself a monster’ (Season 2, 
Episode 2).
So Dexter is framed in the series as a monster. 
Left at that, there isn’t much to concern us: another 
serial killer, another media construction in which the 
writers play on the fact that we use ‘monstrous’ to 
describe those creatures who defy moral codes and 
kill, another inhuman human, another candidate for 
the title of this year’s ‘Mr. Monster’.2 However, one 
of the reasons Dexter can be so successful a serial 
killer (and thus monster) is because he works in the 
forensics team of the Miami Metro, specializing as a 
blood analyst. In other words, Dexter works within 
the police. He is not a police oicer per se, though 
often masquerades as one, but like many serial killers 
he has a place within the general system of police 
power.3 Indeed, the fact that he is not a uniformed 
police oicer as such alerts us to the wider concept 
of police power, to which I will be alluding below. 
Dexter is a monster born into the police power: his 
adoptive father, who helped ‘create’ him as a serial 
killer as he matured, was a police oicer whose own 
history was of being restricted and frustrated by the 
rules under which the police must operate, which in 
turn feeds into his own willingness to teach Dexter 
a ‘code’ by which the latter can kill without guilt. 
And the fact that he is ‘a very neat monster’, as he 
describes himself in the very irst episode of the irst 
series (a point repeated in Series 2, Episode 10: ‘For 
a very neat monster I’m making an awful mess’), 
comes in the form of aping police practice: the blood 
slides, the cataloguing, the perfectly organized set of 
weapons. When he goes about his killings he enacts 
key aspects of the police procedural: investigating a 
suspect, establishing the suspect’s motive, inding 
clues, establishing guilt, hunting, capturing, ques-
tioning and punishing. 
All of which is to say that what is interesting 
about Dexter is not that he is somehow stepping in to 
enforce some kind of natural law of justice or punish-
ment (which is said by cultural analyses of Dexter 
to be the way in which he becomes somehow our 
monster).4 Rather, his whole modus operandi is a sys-
tematization of the police enterprise itself.5 He ights 
monsters, but has become one; a monster within 
the police power. The series Dexter is a reminder of 
the intimate and abiding connection between the 
monster and the police.
It is remarkable how frequently this connection 
between the monster and the police is overlooked in 
discussions of the power of the monstrous. What I 
want to suggest is that we cannot really grasp the idea 
of the monstrous without simultaneously consider-
ing the idea of the police. The common refrains about 
the monstrous tend to discuss its power in terms of 
the way communities are ordered, subjectivities are 
constituted, identities are bounded and societies are 
bordered: that monsters deine the limits of civiliza-
tion, are deeply connected to insecurity, indicate a 
breakdown in hierarchy and point to the unruliness 
of matter. What is often overlooked in such claims is 
that these are the very same issues that underpin the 
police problematic.6 I want to suggest, therefore, that 
to grasp the power of the monstrous we might need 
to consider it in terms of the ubiquity of the police 
idea in bourgeois modernity.
‘you have all these sayings to describe 
what you do’
In a discussion about his actions with Hannah in 
the inal series, Dexter tries to explain himself. He 
does not speak the language of revenge, or justice, or 
punishment, or law, but uses a particular phrase to 
which Hannah, a killer herself who understands his 
drives and perhaps who would also be said to share 
his monstrosity, responds: ‘you have all these sayings 
to describe what you do’. What sayings are these? The 
speciic one in their conversation is that Dexter has 
described his killings as merely ‘taking out the trash’ 
(Season 8, Episode 7). The comment harks back to a 
scene early in Season 1 (in Episode 3) when Dexter is 
disposing of the body of someone he has killed and 
who we are expected to believe really deserved to 
be killed: I’m ‘taking out the garbage’, he says. Later 
in the same series (in Episode 7) he comments that 
‘deep down, people will appreciate my work: taking 
out the trash.’
Dexter’s description of his monstrous behaviour is 
obviously meant to reinforce his monstrosity: he is so 
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monstrous he can regard some other human beings 
as trash. ‘Taking out the trash’ and ‘cleaning up’ are 
familiar tropes among serial killers explaining their 
crimes: ‘I were just cleaning up streets, our kid. Just 
cleaning up the streets’, commented Peter Sutclife, 
the so-called ‘Yorkshire Ripper’ (a nickname given to 
him by the press; the name he gave himself was ‘The 
Streetcleaner’).7 Yet we should also note that the idea 
of cleaning the streets and disposing of the garbage 
resonates throughout modern police discourse. Study 
after study has reported the extent to which the police 
regard themselves as having a ‘mandate to keep the 
… streets clean’,8 and ethnographies of police oicers 
often comment on the extent to which police oicers 
refer to their work as ‘refuse collectors, sweeping up 
the human dross’.9 ‘The police view their position as 
marking the boundaries of the social order’, notes 
Peter Manning. They seek to stand ‘between the 
higher and lower, the sacred and the profane, the 
clean and the dirty’.10 Constantly ‘treading water in 
human waste’,11 the police see their task as keeping 
the streets clean from the ilth of humanity. The 
‘clearing up’ of crimes is associated with the ‘cleaning 
up’ of the streets. ‘The idea that crimes can be cleared 
up reasserts a belief in a world where disorder can 
be brushed away to restore structural purity and 
where incongruity can be cleaned up to re-create a 
perfectly ordered universe.’12 This is why the same 
ethnographies constantly note that police oicers 
routinely speak of members of what they see as the 
criminal, dangerous and miserable classes as ‘social 
dirt’, ‘slag’, ‘polluted’ and ‘scum’.13 The dirt in ques-
tion is connected to the fact that the same persons 
are regarded as ‘refuse’, ‘waste’ and ‘garbage’. The 
police regard themselves as ‘as a kind of uniformed 
garbage-men’,14 just like the monstrous serial killer 
but in the garb of the state: taking out the trash. 
(And if we take Foucault’s reference to the igure of 
the ‘villain–monster–madman’ seriously enough we 
might add that people considered mad were once 
dealt with by being placed into ‘loony-bins’.) 
The easy interpretation here is that this is about 
disrespect. A longer historical view suggests some-
thing else. When modern police oicers speak of 
cleaning up the moral ilth and social dirt they are 
unknowingly holding on to and yet also twisting one 
of the original powers of police: street cleaning and 
refuse collection. Police once had the responsibil-
ity to ensure the streets were clean; virtually all 
the police theorists of the seventeenth, eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, from low-ranking 
cameralists to the high-ranking philosophers of state 
power, listed garbage collection as one of the police 
functions. The reason they did so was because dirt 
and its associated matter such as rubbish are an 
offence against order. It is not lack of cleanliness itself 
that is the problem, but the fact that the lack of 
cleanliness undermines good order – ‘I enjoy my 
work. It brings order to the chaos’, says Dexter, a 
comment that applies to his work in the police and 
his work as a serial killer (Season 2, Episode 1). The 
removal of the dirt and the taking out of the trash is 
the reimposition of order, a re-placement of matter 
into an ordered system.15
From Dexter’s reference to taking out the trash we 
have very quickly arrived at the central category of 
police power: order. From the late ifteenth century, 
political discourse in Europe centred very much on 
the concept of police, a term which denoted the 
legislative and administrative regulation of the 
internal life of a community to promote general 
welfare and the condition of good order. The idea 
behind it was encapsulated in phrases such as ‘police 
and good order’, ‘good police and order’ and ‘well-
ordered police state’. The instructions and activities 
considered necessary for good order were known as 
police ordinances and referred to the management 
and direction of the population by the state. That 
‘order’ was the central police concept is evident in 
the heterogeneous range of afairs and minutia of 
social life that came under the police power. ‘Matters 
of police are things of every instant, which usually 
amount to but little’, notes Montesquieu, adding 
that ‘the actions of the police are quick and the 
police is exerted over things that recur every day’. As 
such, police ‘is perpetually busy with details’.16 Such 
details reached from public security to public health 
(‘medical police’); from poor relief to food adultera-
tion; from the maintenance of roads, bridges and 
town buildings to expenses at christenings, weddings 
and funerals; from the performance of trades and 
occupations to the wearing of extravagant cloth-
ing; from morals and manners to the behaviour of 
servants towards their masters; and, of course, from 
street-cleaning to garbage collection. This is why 
police texts concern themselves with ‘the general and 
common good of society’. As political administration, 
‘police’ was nothing less than the fabrication of social 
order: ‘by a wise police, the sovereign accustoms the 
people to order’.17 Thus, despite the fact that this 
project shifts as policing developed in conjunction 
with the shifts in the nature of both state power 
and the development of capital (we can divide the 
history of police into three stages, with the irst two 
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separated by the Thirty Years War and the third stage 
really coming into being with the ‘new police’ forces 
of the early nineteenth century), one can still ind a 
consistency in the police function throughout these 
stages, rooted in the problem of (dis)order and as part 
of the ‘science of governing men’.
I am making this point for reasons that are prob-
ably clear to anyone thinking about the power of the 
monstrous, but to spell it out: all of the key issues 
that occur in debates about monstrosity – insecurity 
and community, hierarchy and rule, class and power, 
subjectivity and identity, borders and boundaries 
– point to the problem of (dis)order posed by the 
monster. Now, the roots of this disorder might be 
said to lie in the key original frame of reference of 
the monster, namely natural history: ‘the study of 
the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature on 
monsters’ treats them as ‘aberrations in the natural 
order’, say Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston, and 
others follow suit: ‘the idea of the monstrous involves 
a disruption of the supposed orders of nature’.18 But 
the use of ‘monstrosity’ to describe aberrations or dis-
ruptions in nature was very easily applied to aberra-
tions or disruptions in the social order (the metaphor 
of the body politic looms large here, as we shall see) 
and far greater interest is now expressed what might 
be called social or political monsters. Yet one cannot 
talk about order without talking about the fact that 
(dis)order is the fundamental police problem.
To say that (dis)order is the fundamental police 
problem is to suggest that the key police concept is 
order rather than crime or law. The stress on the 
socio-political dimensions of monstrosity tends to 
focus attention on law, often said to be the second 
frame of reference of the monster due to the fact that 
aberrations of nature were also thought to breach 
legal classiications.19 This is why the criminal has 
played such a central role in the study of monstrosity, 
as Foucault has made clear. The penal justice system 
that was developed and reined with the consolida-
tion of the bourgeois state would ind monster after 
monster within the social body, a igure who had 
fallen outside the social pact and who was thereby 
associated with a possible criminality.20 In Discipline 
and Punish Foucault comments that ‘the criminal 
designated as the enemy of all, whom it is in the 
interest of all to track down, falls outside the pact, 
disqualiies himself as a citizen and emerges, bearing 
within him as it were, a wild fragment of nature’. This 
creature appears as a villain or monster or madman.21 
‘Every criminal could well be a monster’, Foucault 
adds in lectures given at the time of writing Discipline 
and Punish, ‘just as previously it was possible that 
the monster was a criminal.’22 Pasquale Pasquino 
has extended this argument by suggesting that it is 
around the igure of Homo criminalis that criminol-
ogy will emerge and about which penal theory will 
come to construct a whole knowledge and set of 
apparatuses, but that the ancestor of Homo criminalis 
is the monster.23 The role of the serial killer as our 
archetypal social monster plays heavily on this con-
nection, as my opening comments also suggest. 
Yet this focus on the way that the individual who 
commits crimes comes to be regarded as monstrous 
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is somehow not enough. Why? Because it treats mon-
strosity as a ‘challenge of law’24 when in fact the basis 
of the original juridico-natural frame of reference 
was order rather than law. The twinning of ‘law’ and 
‘order’ in the commonplace ‘law-and-order’ masks the 
fact that from the police perspective ‘order’ is the key 
concept; conversely, ‘police’ does not equal ‘law’.
Note Montesquieu on the police again, repeating 
a point that appears in virtually all police theory of 
the time: ‘it has regulations rather than laws’, and 
so one must not confuse ‘violations of the laws with 
the simple violation of the police’. Lest Montesquieu’s 
comment appear out of date, note the following fea-
tures of police powers vis-à-vis ‘the law’. 
First, police powers are almost always situated 
either fully in the executive or across executive and 
judiciary, never solely within the juridical realm. 
Second, the police have constantly extended the 
boundaries of ‘legal’ behaviour to the point where 
the law itself has been transformed, for example 
in Britain by change in the judges’ rules by which 
the police operated, then through important judi-
cial indings, and inally in new legislation. Hence, 
third, rather than police carrying out law as made by 
Parliament, Parliament has made laws which have 
legitimized existing police practice. ‘Law reform’ is 
often little more than a product and legitimation of 
police operational practices, with the law rewritten to 
suit the exercise of police power. Fourth, the police 
operate with a huge amount of discretion, which, 
far more than legal codes, shapes the way the police 
behave. The lexibility in the police concept we noted 
earlier ofered a vagueness that historically left a 
great deal to police discretion, and this has never 
been removed. It runs from stopping and searching 
people on spurious grounds – ‘moving quickly’ and 
‘moving slowly’ are both the basis for a stop – to 
violent assault and killing; we might even add acts of 
police discretion that have only recently come to light 
and that have been described by victims as ‘rape by 
the state’.25 The expansive nature of discretion has its 
foundation in the permissive structure of law and the 
powers given to the police to preserve order. In efect, 
and ifth, the police power has often simply ignored 
demands that something called the rule of law be 
followed. Indeed, research suggests that most oicers 
believe that to fully impose the rule of law on police 
work would render it impossible, and senior police 
oicers are on record saying that there is a ‘moral 
justiication for getting round the rules’.26 All of this 
happens through a coordinated efort on the part of 
the police to legitimate their actions by persuading 
judges, politicians and the public that what they are 
doing is necessary to curb crime and in the name of 
that most bourgeois of fetishes: security. 
Looked at politically, then, we need to read police 
power through the lens of order rather than law. 
But then this might mean that looked at in terms 
of ‘disorder’ we need to read the power of the mon-
strous through the lens of police. It is the diiculty in 
categorizing the monster in the ‘order of things’ that 
makes the monster represent something far more 
challenging to the bourgeois imagination than mere 
illegality: disorder. 
‘here i am, in the belly of the beast’
In the series of lectures published as Abnormal, 
Foucault suggests that although every criminal could 
well be a monster, irst among these as threat is the 
political criminal, the one who breaks the social 
pact and who, by being against society, is seemingly 
against nature. Foucault points out that although the 
political monster might in fact be the King or Queen 
or some other ‘monstrous’ sovereign, there is also the 
monster ‘that breaks the social pact by revolt’.27 This 
is the ‘monster from below’ to match the ‘monster 
from above’, and Foucault places it at the heart of the 
juridico-medical theme of the monstrosity.28 Yet if we 
accept the revolt of the monster from below as more 
signiicant both politically and historically, as I think 
we must, then it is also surely the case that the revolt 
of this monster is at the heart of the police problem. 
One might consider this in the light of the thinker 
who most obviously placed the concept of order at 
the heart of state power, who did so through an 
articulation of the problematic of security, and who 
did both these things by organizing his work around 
the famous monsters of Leviathan and Behemoth. To 
title works with the name of two biblical monsters 
was truly provocative, as Hobbes knew full well; not 
for nothing did he earn himself the nickname ‘the 
Monster of Malmesbury’. But what do they mean, 
and why might they help us grasp the monster with 
the police?
The biblical creature Behemoth appears in the 
Bible in the Book of Job, just prior to the appearance 
of the beast called the Leviathan, which Hobbes uses 
to symbolize the stately creation that brings peace, 
security and order. Interpretations of Hobbes’s use of 
‘Behemoth’ for the title vary, but the dominant one is 
that Hobbes chose ‘the odd name of Behemoth, which 
signiies in Hebrew language an Elephant, seeming to 
think that the civil dissensions of such a numerous 
and powerful people, as the English nation, might be 
13
justly compared to the wild and formidable motions 
of that enormous animal when provoked.’29 Although 
Hobbes seems to be referring to the ‘Long Parliament’, 
the Behemoth comes to symbolize more generally the 
‘circular motion of the sovereign power through two 
usurpers’.30 The two usurpers in question appear 
to be the disorderly anarchy of revolution and the 
lawlessness of rebellion. As Franz Neumann puts it, 
Behemoth ‘depicts a non-state, a chaos, a situation of 
lawlessness, disorder, and anarchy’.31 
Set against Behemoth is Leviathan. Whatever the 
two creatures are meant to signify in the Book of Job 
(an elephant or hippopotamus-like land monster on 
the one hand compared to a whale-like sea monster 
on the other), in the Hebrew tradition in general 
and the Old Testament as a whole ‘Leviathan is 
the epitome of all the monsters of the sea, just as 
in the same tradition Behemoth is the epitome of 
all terrestrial monsters, and they are conceived of 
both as antagonists and as elemental opposites.’32 
More to the point, whatever the two creatures are 
meant to signify in either the Hebrew tradition or 
the Bible (and although Hobbes refers to the Book of 
Job when mentioning Leviathan he does not do so 
when mentioning Behemoth), it is clear that Hobbes 
employed the monstrous Leviathan as a symbol for 
the state of peace, security and order, and the mon-
strous Behemoth as a symbol for the state of civil war, 
rebellion and disorder, and ofered the former as the 
only alternative to the latter. It would appear that 
one monster, an enormous security system known 
as the Leviathan state, exists in order to continu-
ously hold down another monster, the revolution-
ary people understood as the Behemoth.33 Stephen 
Holmes puts it succinctly: ‘it takes one monster to 
subdue another’.34 And yet this does not quite tell 
the whole story.
David Williams notes that ‘Leviathan is the 
marine representative of a group of monsters whose 
chief signiicance is in their devouring activity.’ The 
Leviathan swallows its victims whole, but does not 
destroy them. The victims ‘go through the process of 
being devoured … but without, in fact, being anni-
hilated’.35 This devouring points us to the image 
used as the frontispiece of Leviathan: the Sovereign 
incorporates his subjects by devouring them.36 We 
are immediately reminded of the importance of the 
belly to the body politic: Hobbes’s sometime employer 
Francis Bacon had commented in his essay ‘On Sedi-
tion’ that ‘rebellions of the belly are the worst’,37 and 
Hobbes’s Leviathan has to deal with ‘wormes’ (too 
many corporations), ‘intestine disorder’ (errors made 
when instituting a Commonwealth), and Bulimia 
(‘enlarging Dominion’). We might also be reminded of 
Bishop Bramhall’s suggestion that Hobbes be allowed 
to set up a Leviathan-state among the American 
Indians, believing that ‘if he should put his principles 
into practice as magisterially as he doth dictate them, 
his supposed subjects might chance to tear their 
Mortal God to pieces with their teeth and entomb his 
Sovereignty in their bowels.’38 And maybe we are also 
reminded that in the Philosophical Rudiments Concern-
ing Government and Society, published the same year 
as Leviathan, Hobbes had suggested that ‘all kings are 
to be reckoned amongst ravenous beasts’.39 Whatever 
we are reminded of, the point is that it is not so much 
that one monster holds down or subdues the other, 
but that one monster devours the other and preserves 
it inside the belly of the beast. ‘Here I am, in the belly 
of the beast’, says Dexter one day in the oice of the 
Miami Metro (Season 2, Episode 2). 
Yet, as well as devouring the subjects, the image 
on the frontispiece of Leviathan also presents the 
individual subjects as forming the protective armour 
of the body politic. This is a beast whose body ‘is 
made of rows of shields, shut up closely as with a 
seal’, notes the Bible; ‘one is so near to another that 
no air can come between them’ (Job 41:15). The image 
therefore also presents Leviathan as an airless prison 
of the very kind that awaits those who are willing 
to seek the security ofered by the sovereign.40 The 
double meaning points us to the centrality of the 
prison system to modern state power: ‘here we are, 
in the belly of the beast’ is the comment made time 
and again by politically astute prisoners, and the Red 
Army Faction adopted as their prison nicknames 
the characters from Moby-Dick as a sign of their 
ight against the whale-like Leviathan-state that was 
devouring them.41 But it also points us to the prison 
of security more generally.
The irst point to be made, therefore, is that the 
police power instituted with the modern state might 
be thought of as a power to devour one and all, 
everything it encounters, including other monsters, 
subsuming them within its own force and keeping 
them within its security frame. (And we might ask in 
parenthesis: allowing them to emerge only as excre-
ment, as shitty subjects?) The monster from below is 
also the monster within. Yet this also does not quite 
tell the whole story.
The reference to the monstrous Leviathan might 
appear to pre-empt a reference to Nietzsche’s sugges-
tion that the state is the coldest of all monsters. But, 
as Nietzsche adds, the state also lies about this. The 
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lie that creeps from its mouth is ‘I, the state, am the 
people’.42 And if there is one thing that ‘the people’ 
does not wish to imagine itself as, it is monstrous. 
Indeed, if Job’s sufering, fear and insecurity in the 
Book of Job as a whole is meant by Hobbes to refer 
more or less to the condition of man in the state of 
nature, and if the implication is that this condition 
is overcome only by submission to the new mighty 
sovereign, then any ‘monstrous’ features of this new 
order really must be hidden away. The state’s emer-
gence alongside civil society and ‘the people’, and the 
state’s administration of civil society and ‘the people’ 
in the name of order and security, require that the 
state appears to be above not only the beastly condi-
tion of the state of nature but also somehow above 
all forms of monstrosity. Any hint of the state’s own 
monstrosity must therefore disappear from view.
So far must the state’s monstrosity disappear from 
view that in Hobbes’s account the monstrosity in 
question is barely hinted at in the irst place. The 
Leviathan makes four appearances in Hobbes’s text: 
in the introduction, in which it is understood as a 
huge artiicial man, a huge artiicial animal, and a 
huge machine; in chapter 17, where it is described as a 
‘Mortall God’; in chapter 28, where it is referred to in 
the discussion of the chapter in Job; and as an image 
on the frontispiece, which shows a huge person.43 
In none of these appearances is the key feature the 
Leviathan’s monstrosity. Rather, its key feature is its 
power. The passage from the Book of Job at the top 
of the image and repeated in chapter 28 makes this 
clear: ‘upon earth there is nothing to compare with 
his power’. This is a point repeated by Hobbes at the 
end of the same chapter, where he reiterates the claim 
that there can be nothing greater than the Leviathan. 
And of the many points made about the Leviathan in 
the introduction the one stressed is that this creation 
turns out to be ‘of greater stature and strength’ than 
any other body or creature.44 Moreover, among the 
various meanings that lexicographers and commen-
tators had ascribed to ‘Leviathan’, Hobbes would have 
encountered deinitions such as ‘prince’, ‘king’, ‘asso-
ciation’ and ‘society’. A commentary on the Book of 
Job by Jacques Bolduc published in Lyon in 1619 and 
Paris in 1637 writes of ‘liviath’ now meaning ‘crown’, 
following its roots in ‘joining together’, making the 
link with the aquatic beast on the grounds that the 
beast’s scales are close together, as a unity, and sug-
gesting that ‘leviathan’ is now also a name for a 
collectivity of men.45 
In other words, the point of the Leviathan is to 
appear not as an omnipotent monster, but as the 
omnipotent technology of an organizing power: as 
machine, as organic being, as mortal God. It ulti-
mately does not really matter which of these forms 
the state takes, since what matters is that any hint of 
monstrosity is replaced by the far more neutral and 
far less threatening ‘science of governing men’. The 
use of ‘Leviathan’ as the title of the book may well 
have been designed as a provocation,46 and no doubt 
15
Hobbes believed that his readers would quickly grasp 
the allusion to the biblical monster, but the hint at 
the monstrosity of Leviathan only serves to reveal the 
emergence of absolute authority as a technology of 
power for preserving the peace. The abiding concern 
of Hobbes is, at the end of the day, the problem of 
order, presented by Leviathan as an omnipotent tech-
nology exercised in the name of security, the supreme 
concept of bourgeois society: the concept of police.47
In this light we might tweak slightly a comment 
from Thomas Carlyle, one tweaked in turn by Carl 
Schmitt when he alludes to it in his commentary 
on Hobbes: Behemoth versus Leviathan is the world 
of rebellious anarchy versus the world of police.48 
Hobbes’s account of the creation of the Leviathan 
rests heavily on the perpetual war of the state of 
nature within which the fear and insecurity, danger 
and disorder, will push people to seek the protection 
of the sovereign. But the transition from the state 
of war to submission to the Leviathan leaves open 
the possibility that the war continues in the form of 
internal rebellion. It continues, that is, in the form 
of revolutionary movements within the body politic: 
inside the belly of the beast. So the fundamental fear 
and insecurity which permeate the perpetual war 
of the state of nature are assumed to exist also in 
the condition of rebellion and revolt, which are ‘but 
warre renewed’ (as ‘intestine’ rather than ‘foreign’ 
war, as Hobbes puts it).49 The sovereign is expected 
to ofer security and protection from all such fears 
in exchange for obedience, for ‘the end of Obedience 
is Protection’.50 What is conjured up is, as Derrida 
puts it, an ‘insurance policy [police d’assurance]’ which 
basically entrusts to sovereignty the very powers of 
security and protection that will be called ‘police’.51 
If we now read the fear of rebellion and civil war as 
a fear of the Behemoth, then what is being ofered is 
in fact security from the monster, and the dialectical 
relationship that Derrida reads between ‘the beast 
and the sovereign’ might thus be reconsidered as a 
relationship between ‘the monster and the police’. The 
security offered by the state displaces the monstrosity 
of the state and is turned towards the monstrosity 
of disorder. The monstrousness of the Leviathan is 
no longer the issue, for the state becomes instead a 
police operation against the monstrous Behemoth. 
This is why it is more important to keep in sight 
the monstrosity of the Behemoth rather than the 
Leviathan. ‘Behemoth’ is the Hebrew plural form of 
a word meaning ‘beast’ but also signiies an ‘aggrega-
tion of monsters’.52 Behemoth is a plurality of forces 
and thus, in a sense, the beastly and multifaceted 
multitude. To keep the Behemoth in sight is thus to 
hold on to the observation that in being devoured by 
the Leviathan the Behemoth continues to exist inside 
the police power, as the permanent enemy within. 
It is also to keep in sight the fact that as ‘rebellion’, 
‘revolution’, ‘civil war’ and ‘disorder’, Behemoth is a 
monster with many heads.
In The Many-Headed Hydra Peter Linebaugh and 
Markus Rediker argue that the merchants, manu-
facturers, planters and oicials of the dominant 
European states found in the multi-headed monster 
a key motif for the rebellious disorder of the lower 
classes. This motif worked alongside the under-
standing of the igure of Hercules.53 Hercules was 
regarded as uniier of the territorial state by the 
Greeks, signiied imperial ambition to the Romans, 
and was associated in general with a vast labour for 
the fabrication of order: draining swamps, developing 
agriculture, securing commerce and even keeping 
things clean (speciically, the Augean stables). The 
ruling class has long regarded its task of constructing 
a bourgeois order and instilling the discipline of wage 
labour among the unruly workers as ‘Herculean’.54 In 
1649, for example, Antony Ascham noted in his Of 
the Confusions and Revolutions of Governments that 
‘Governours of men are like keepers of beasts; Every man 
as he is an Animal, participating halfe with the brute 
… When an irregular passion breaks out in a state, an 
irrational beast hath broke out of his grate or cave, 
and puts the Keeper to a great deal of trouble.’ This 
beastliness culminates in the monster of revolution, 
and Ascham’s call was for a new Hercules, who was 
also known as an executioner, ‘to tame Monsters or 
usurpers’.55 The speciic monster that Hercules was 
meant to tame or destroy was the many-headed hydra 
of Lerna. As Hobbes puts it, dealing with subjects is 
a task ‘like that of Hercules with the Monster Hydra, 
which having many heads, for every one that was 
vanquished, there grew up three’.56
Linebaugh and Rediker show just how far the 
many-headed hydra was understood in terms of the 
rebellious and dangerous classes:
When the proletariat was rebellious and self-active, 
it was described as a monster, a many-headed 
hydra. Its heads included food rioters (Shake-
speare); heretics (Thomas Edwards); army agitators 
(Thomas Fairfax); antinomians and independent 
women (Cotton Mather); maroons (Governor Mau-
ricius); motley urban mobs (Peter Oliver); general 
strikers (J. Cunningham); rural barbarians of the 
commons (Thomas Malthus); aquatic labour-
ers (Patrick Colquhoun); freethinkers (William 
Reid); and striking textile workers (Andrew Ure). 
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Nameless commentators added peasant rebels, 
Levellers, pirates and slave insurrectionists to 
the long list. Fearful of the energy, mobility and 
growth of social forces beyond their control, the 
writers, heresy hunters, generals, ministers, of-
icials, population theorists, policemen, merchants, 
manufacturers and planters ofered up their curses, 
which called down Herculean destruction upon the 
hydra’s heads.57
It is in this context that we need to keep in sight the 
monstrosity of the Behemoth. In Hobbes’s Behemoth, 
one part of the dialogue runs as follows: 
B. You have read, that when Hercules ighting with 
the Hydra, had cut of any one of his many heads, 
there still arose two other heads in its place; and 
yet at last he cut them of all.
A. The story is told false. For Hercules at irst did 
not cut of those heads, but bought them of; and 
afterwards, when he saw it did him no good, then 
he cut them of, and got the victory.58
The Herculean task of the capitalist ruling class 
has been to construct the new bourgeois order, and 
the myth of the many-headed monster simultane-
ously expressed the fear and justiied the violence 
of the ruling class in carrying out this task.59 Build-
ing such order and exercising violence against any 
force obstructing that process are the deinition of 
police power. It is to conduct this Herculean task that 
Leviathan exists: a political machine of/for security 
and a political body of/for police to defeat the multi-
headed enemy. 
Yet the problem for the ruling class is that this 
struggle is never really over – the victory never really 
‘got’, as Hobbes puts it – because despite buying of 
or cutting of the various heads as they appear, the 
monster lies within the body politic. This is why 
police discourse from the sixteenth century to the 
present has never stopped telling us of the perma-
nent wars being fought against the enemy within: 
the disorderly, unruly, criminal, indecent, disobedi-
ent, disloyal, lawless and mindless, each of which 
morphs into the other, constantly changing shape 
in monstrous fashion, lining up with or brushing up 
alongside the killer, the regicide and the terrorist, and 
even performing the ilthy trick of appearing to be 
human.60 This multi-headed hydra is a creature the 
ruling class fears will devour it, and so the creature 
must itself be devoured; an uncontainable creature 
which must nevertheless somehow be contained. The 
need for the creature to be contained is why the 
concept of ‘keeping’ – in the sense of ‘guarding’ or 
‘holding’ but also from ‘the keep’, referring to the 
inner stronghold of a castle – is so important in 
Leviathan: keeping the subjects in obedience, keeping 
them from discontent, keeping them quiet, keeping 
them from rebellion, keeping them in space, keeping 
them in order and keeping them in awe, all rolled 
into the core principle of police theory: keeping the 
peace.61 Leviathan is the police power of contain-
ment, keeping us safe and secure from our monsters, 
ourselves.
Remember the monsters? Remember 
the police
In the inal episode of the inal series of Dexter there 
is a lashback scene to the moment of the birth of 
Dexter’s son. Dexter is worrying about whether he 
will make a good father, and Deb reassures him 
that he will. ‘You’ve always taken care of me’, she 
says, especially when they were young: ‘you made 
me feel so fucking safe’. In particular, she reminds 
him of her greatest fear during the night: ‘Don’t you 
remember the monsters?’, she asks, and then reminds 
him that he made her feel secure by explaining that 
‘the monsters were just the shadows’. Deb’s sugges-
tion that Dexter protected her from the monsters is 
immediately undermined by Dexter’s voice-over: ‘you 
were so wrong Deb’. Wrong because there really are 
monsters and Dexter is one of them? Perhaps. But 
maybe she was right, in that this monster nonetheless 
did protect her and keep her safe and secure. This 
monster had more than a touch of the police power.
Security and protection are two of the most funda-
mental mechanisms that underpin the police power. 
But in security there is always insecurity and in 
protection there is always fear. One of the functions 
of the power of the monstrous is that it is crucial 
to the political construction of fear and insecurity. 
Circulating around and operating through the fears 
and insecurities of bourgeois modernity, the monster 
and the police come together. With the continual 
iteration of issues concerning order and disorder, 
security and identity, borders and boundaries, con-
tainment and excess, the discourses of monstrosity 
and police share a fundamental conceptual ground: 
a problem to be contained and a process of contain-
ment. It is for this very reason that all of the main 
themes in the discourse of monstrosity point to the 
police problematic. 
That it does so is connected to the fact that capi-
talism teems with monsters. Aliens, iends, vampires 
and zombies dominate the cultural scene; reports on 
scientiic developments are frequently presented in 
terms of their potentially ‘monstrous’ implications; 
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and journalism resorts to describing as ‘monstrous’ 
a whole host of persons, from the paedophile to the 
serial killer to the despotic leader. More recently, 
it has been suggested that capitalism is itself mon-
strous. Yet, like everything else it lets loose in the 
world, capitalism has to manage its monsters.62 It has 
to manage itself, its own monstrosity, and its own 
monster within. This is the monster that capitalism 
brings into being through the police power and that 
it must constantly manage with the police power. 
Bourgeois modernity gives us the monster and the 
police.
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